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INTRODUCTION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or
"Commission") receives nearly 60,000 charges of employment dis-
crimination each year under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or
national origin.2 The grievance process for employees who believe
they have been victims of discrimination is complicated by the dual
nature of these complaints: claims first must be made to the EEOC
before a plaintiff may have his day in court by filing a complaint in the
appropriate United States district court.
3
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at Williams. In addition, I would like to thank the editors of the University of Pennsylva-
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I U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 Charges: FY 1992-FY 2000, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html (last modified
Jan. 18, 2001) [hereinafter EEOC, Title VII Charges].
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin .... ).
3 The process actually is complicated further by another duality of this system. In
mostjurisdictions (save primarily those in the Southeast), the charge first must be filed
with the relevant state agency and available state remedies must be exhausted before
the EEOC takes charge. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 470-72
(689)
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Assuming state remedies (if applicable) have been exhausted, the
plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the al-
4leged unlawful practice. If the EEOC is unable to achieve concilia-
tion with a private employer within thirty days, the Commission may
bring a civil action in United States district court. A very small per-
centage of cases are resolved in this manner.( If the Commission does
not bring suit, it must notify the claimant:
If a charge filed with the Commission... is dismissed by the Commis-
sion, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such
charge... the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section
... or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to
which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify
the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such no-
tice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the
7charge.., by the person claiming to be aggrieved ....
This Comment addresses the question of when the EEOC can give
such notice-commonly called a "right-to-sue letter" because it gives
an employee the right to file a lawsuit in United States district court-
to a claimant. Specifically, must the EEOC wait until the 180-day pe-
riod has elapsed, or may it authorize an "early" suit prior to the expi-
ration of the statutory period?
In several jurisdictions, the EEOC has been unable to act on the
charges within the 180-day period and has issued right-to-sue letters
prior to the expiration of that time period. One interpretation of the
statutory provision is that the EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction within
(student ed. 1988). Because the federal/state distinction is beyond the scope of this
Comment, all analysis assumes that the state remedy is exhausted and assumes that the
plaintiff's only obstacle to getting into United States district court is getting through
the EEOC.
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (1994).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (1994). When the employer is a government, govern-
mental agency, or political subdivision, the Commission shall refer the case to the at-
torney general. Id.
6 In fiscal year ("FY') 1999, the EEOC brought direct suits in only 324 cases out of
57,582 charges filed under Title VII; in FY 2000, the number of direct suits fell to 222
while the number of charges increased to 59,588. U.S. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, 0,OC Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 Through FY 2000, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last modified Mar. 1, 2000); see also infra
note 105 (reporting the total number of charges filed with the EEOC in FY 1999 and
FY 2000). Direct suits filed by the EEOC account for only about one-half of one per-
cent of all Title VII charges filed with the Commission. In FY 2000, dividing 222 direct
suits by 59,588 charges yields 0.373% of the total caseload; in FY 1999, dividing 324 by
57,682 yields 0.563%.
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1994).
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this 180-day period and the plaintiff may not file suit until this period
has elapsed The contrary interpretation is that the Commission has
the ability to cede its jurisdiction and allow a plaintiff to sue prior to
the expiration of the 180-day period.'J
In Part I of this Comment, I discuss the cases holding that the
EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction during the statutory period and re-
quiring remand to the agency before a complaint may be filed in
United States district court. In Part II, I analyze the cases holding that
a plaintiff may sue upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter prior to the
end of the 180-day period. In Part III, I examine the legislative history
of the applicable statutory provisions. In Part IV, I discuss which of
the two interpretations of the EEOC's jurisdiction is more economi-
cally efficient and conclude that there is no clear answer. In Part V, I
suggest two alternatives to those interpretations that could make reso-
lution of employment discrimination cases even more efficient-one
giving the EEOC a much larger role in these cases and the other
eliminating the role of the Commission altogether.
I. MARTINIAND OTHER CASES SUPPORTING REMAND TO THE AGENCY
FOR EARLY ISSUANCE OF A RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTER
In 1999, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
was the first appellate court to hold that the EEOC may not issue an
early right-to-sue letter. In Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n,
the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded a judgment in favor of plain-
tiff Elizabeth Martini for $903,500 on sexual harassment and retalia-
tion claims following a jury trial because the EEOC had granted a
right-to-sue letter only twenty-one days after she had filed her charge
with the Commission.' ° The court "conclude[d] that the EEOC's
power to authorize private suits within 180 days undermines its ex-
press statutory duty to investigate every charge filed, as well as Con-
gress's unambiguous policy of encouraging informal resolution of
charges up to the 180th day."" Although some district courts had
held that early right-to-sue letters were not permissible, this was the
first circuit court to make this decision and thus invalidate the regula-
tion issued by the EEOC. This decision in Martini created a circuit
split that provides an important issue for resolution by the United
8 See infra notes 10-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases so holding.
See infra notes 35-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases so holding.
10 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 1147 (2000).
1Id. at 1347.
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States Supreme Court.
The EEOC had issued the following regulation based upon its in-
terpretation of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(f) (1):
When a person claiming to be aggrieved requests, in writing, that a no-
tice of right to sue be issued.., the Commission may issue such notice..
. at any time prior to the expiration of 180 days from the date of filing
the charge with the Commission; provided, that the District Director [or
other delegated officials] has determined that it is probable that the
Commission will be unable to complete its administrative processing of
the charge within 180 days from the filing of the charge and has at-
tached a written certificate to that effect.
12
A court interpreting an administrative agency's construction of a
statute uses the two-step inquiry mandated by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.13  The court must first ask
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at is-
sue."14 If so, then the unambiguous intent of Congress must be car-
ried out by the reviewing court. 1 But "if the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute."'16 The Martini court found that "Congress clearly in-
tended to prohibit private suits within 180 days after charges are
filed,"'7 and it therefore held that the agency's interpretation that al-
lowed for early right-to-sue letters violated the clear, unambiguous in-
tent of Congress and had to be overruled under Chevron.
In deciphering the intent of Congress not to allow early private
suits, the Martini court relied on the provision prescribing the EEOC's
duties that requires a prompt determination-within 120 days if prac-
ticable."' The court found that "the Commission's duty to investigate
is both mandatory and unqualified."' Further, it stated that Congress
"'hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and
12 Notice of Right to Sue: Procedure and Authority, 29 C.F.R. § 160 1.28(a) (2)
(1997).
13 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 842-43.
16 Id. at 842.
17 Martini, 178 F.3d at 1346.
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994) ("The Commission shall make its determina-
tion on reasonable cause as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later
than one hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge .....
19 Martini, 178 F.3d at 1347.
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not the rule."'' 0 Not allowing early private suits should put pressure
on the EEOC to improve its investigatory procedures or perhaps to
ask Congress for additional funding so that it would be able to com-
plete its statutory duties.2
The United States Supreme Court, in dictum, prior to the EEOC's
promulgation of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28, reached the same conclusion as
the Martini court when seven Justices agreed that a plain reading of
the statute compels the finding that early suits prior to the expiration
of 180 days should not be permitted. In Occidental Life Insurance Co. of
California v. EEOC, the Court stated, "[A] natural reading of [the stat-
ute] can lead only to the conclusion that it simply provides that a
complainant whose charge is not dismissed or promptly settled or liti-
gated by the EEOC may himself bring a lawsuit, but that he must wait
180 days before doing so. '22 The Court considered a claim by a de-
fendant that the 180-day period was a statute of limitations and the
EEOC could not file a charge beyond the expiration of this time.23
The Court rejected this assertion and, without knowledge or consid-
eration that this issue would later become relevant, found that the
EEOC must wait 180 days before giving permission to a plaintiff to file
a charge in United States district court.2
4
After the EEOC promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (2), a district
court used similar reasoning to that of the Supreme Court in Occiden-
tal Life. In Montoya v. Valencia County, the court held that, even exer-
cising the deference to the Commission required by Chevron, the
EEOC's interpretation was "patently inconsistent with section 2000e-
5(f) (1)." 25 The court therefore rejected the allowance of an early suit
and subsequently granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
case.2 6 The court expressed sympathy for the EEOC's difficulties in
carrying out its duties but suggested that the proper way to resolve the
lack of funding and inability to investigate all charges within the statu-
tory time limit was to ask Congress to amend the statute or increase
funding, and that unilateral action by the agency in issuing a regula-S 21
tion contrary to its underlying statute was not the solution.
20 Id. at 1346-47 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972)).
21 Id. at 1347.
22 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977).
23 Id. at 358-66.
24 Id. at 366.
25 872 F. Supp. 904,906 (D.N.M. 1994).
26 Id.
27 See id. ("The Commission must look to Congress to amend the statute or other-
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In New York v. Holiday Inns, Inc., the district court noted the attrac-
tiveness of allowing plaintiffs to sue prior to the expiration of the time
period when the EEOC is backlogged, but quoted the dictum from
Occidental Life stating that it was Congress's intent that 180 days must
elapse before charges could be filed in district court. The court
noted that despite the apparent "futility of forcing victims of discrimi-
nation to 'mark time' when it appears that the EEOC will be unable to
investigate their charges or reach conciliation proceedings within the
180-day period," arguments for allowing early suits should be ad-• • • 29
dressed to Congress rather than to the judiciary.
Other courts have noted that the purpose of the 180-day period is
to induce conflict resolution through conciliation within the EEOC
11rather than litigation. In 1980,Judge Sofaer of the Southern District
of New York looked at the problem from a separation of powers per-
spective in Spencer v. Banco Real S.A.: The jurisdiction of the federal
courts should not be expanded byjudicial decision or by agency regu-
lations, but rather through an act of Congress." The court also exam-
ined policy considerations in making its decision. Not allowing suits
would put pressure on the EEOC to improve its efficiency rather than
32simply hand off the work to the courts. Since the Commission still
has to determine which cases to pursue and in which to issue early
right-to-sue letters, it would have too much discretion to decide which
cases to keep and which to give to the courts. This argument about
the incentive effects seems to be the most persuasive objection to al-
lowing early suits.
A further consideration is that employers who are unwilling or
unable to afford litigation costs for even unmeritorious suits may settle
because of the small chance of recovering costs from unsuccessful
plaintiffs3 Title VII plaintiffs might be able to take advantage of this
tendency by trying to sidestep the Commission and sue prior to the
period for investigation and conciliation by the EEOC. The district
wise ease its regulatory burden.").
28 656 F. Supp. 675, 679 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
29 Id. at 679-80.
39 See Mills v. Jefferson Bank E., 559 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D. Colo. 1983) (citing nu-
merous cases to that effect).
1 See 87 F.R.D. 739, 746-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Sofaer, J.) ("Regulation
1601.28(a) (2) in effect permits the agency to expand federal jurisdiction whenever an
aggrieved claimant is impatient with the normal waiting period and the agency feels
unable to complete its tasks within the statutory period.").
32 Id. at 746.
33 Id. at 747.
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court in Spencer ordered a suspension of an early suit for two reasons-
both because it was against Congress's intent and because it was un-
34
supported by policy arguments.
The review of this problem in the District of Columbia Circuit's
opinion in Martini seems to reach the proper result, even if it at first
glance seems unfair to the plaintiff who lost a nearly one million dol-
lar judgment. The good of preventing the EEOC from ceding its ju-
risdiction and choosing which cases it wants to pursue is important.
The plain meaning of the statute and the policy arguments also sup-
port this view. I turn next to the arguments in favor of allowing early
right-to-sue letters, which is the position taken by three circuit courts
and several district courts.
II. SIMS AND OTHER CASES ALLOWING THE EEOC TO ISSUE
RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTERS PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION
OF THE 180-DAY PERIOD
Other courts have held that the EEOC's early right-to-sue regula-
tion in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (a) (2) is valid and have allowed suits in dis-
trict court prior to the expiration of the 180-day period specified in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, found that "the procedural re-
quirements of Title VII are to be viewed as conditions precedent"
rather the jurisdictional requirements.
35 The court was convinced by
three distinct considerations: (1) the regulation itself, (2) the pur-
pose of the 180-day period, and (3) the pointlessness of "marking
time" when the agency will be unable to investigate."
First, alluding to Chevron deference, the court found that the regu-
lation was reasonable and consistent with congressional intent.
37 The
34 Id. at 746-47. The act of suspending a case to allow the EEOC to have the case
until the 180-day period elapsed is effectively the same as dismissing the case without
prejudice, as most other courts have done when coming to the conclusion that early
right-to-sue letters are invalid.
35 22 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994).
46 Id.
37 See id. at 1062 (noting that a regulation must be upheld if it is reasonably related
to the purposes of the underlying legislation). The court also made a point of noting
that the regulation was procedural, perhaps suggesting that courts should be more
deferential on matters of procedure than on matters of substance. See id. ("In enacting
Title VII, Congress charged the Commission with the responsibility to enforce the stat-
ute and vested it with the authority 'to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural
regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter."' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
12(a) (1994))). "A regulation promulgated pursuant to section 713(a) must be up-
held 'so long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation ....
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Sims court believed that the statutory grant of an automatic right to
sue after 180 days did not preclude a suit prior to 180 days under cer-
tain conditions. It reasoned that nothing in the Act prohibited the
EEOC from relinquishing itsjurisdiction.3 9 This is in some ways a cu-
rious assertion-no one would suggest that the Secretary of Defense
has the ability to decide that the Army should take the summer off or
that the Securities and Exchange Commission could decide not to en-
force insider-trading regulations on Wednesdays. When the Commis-
sion gives up its jurisdiction by issuing early right-to-sue letters for cer-
tain actions or types of actions, it is doing so selectively and could
expose its action to a potential challenge under the Administrative
Procedure Act as an arbitrary and capricious agency decision.40
The court persuasively argued, however, that since the aims of Ti-
tle VII are to provide a remedy for victims of employment discrimina-
tion, "'[W]e do not think that Congress intended to force victims of
discrimination to undergo further delay when the district director has
determined such delay to be unnecessary.'- 4' Looking to the legisla-
tive history, the Sims court believed that since Congress was aware of
the EEOC's backlog at the time of the relevant amendments in 1972,
it imposed the provision as a ceiling, or maximum time, to protect the
rights of individuals who had been victims of discrimination: "'The
primary concern must be protection of the aggrieved person's option
to seek a prompt remedy in the best manner available.' 42 Concluding
that such a course would not circumvent Congress's intentions and
that if the Commission has determined that it would be unable to act
on the charge-"'a remand to the Commission would be an exercise
in futility'"4" -the Sims court reversed the district court's dismissal and
allowed the claim to proceed without remand to the EEOC.4 4
In a series of decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Id. (quoting Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (internal
citation omitted)).
38 Id. at 1061.
39 Id. at 1063.
40 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... ).
41 Sims, 22 F.3d at 1063 (quoting Rolark v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 688 F. Supp.
401,404 (N.D. III. 1988)).
42 Id. (quoting H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, REPORT ON H.R. 1746, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPRORTUNITIES ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1971, H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at
13 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2148).
43 Id. (quoting Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 413 n.27 (2d Cir. 1975)).
44 Id.
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has allowed suits to be brought after early right-to-sue letters were is-
sued by the EEOC. In one case, the court looked to the practical dif-
ficulties that the EEOC faced in completing its statutory workload
but-unlike the District of Columbia Circuit and other courts men-
tioned above-assumed without much discussion that the Commission
had the power to abdicate its duty, rather than requiring Congress to
amend the statute.45 In a later case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a dis-
trict court decision that dismissed a claim and remanded to the
Commission. 46 The circuit court found that it was irrelevant whether
the Commission had actually attempted to investigate or conciliate the
47
case.
The most recent court of appeals decision on this issue, in Febru-
ary 2001 by the Tenth Circuit, also upheld the validity of the regula-
tion. In Walker v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the court found that under
the Chevron standard of deference, the regulation in question was a
reasonable interpretation of the underlying statute. 4 The court cited
legislative history in support of this decision, as have other courts
reaching this outcome. 49 The Tenth Circuit also raised a rationale not
considered in other decisions-that the EEOC official reviewing the
charge retains the power to deny a request for an early right-to-sue let-
ter if he believes that it is in the parties' interests to have the EEOC
continue attempts to resolve the dispute.50  This is an interesting
point, and one that would be important if we could assume the exis-
tence of an omniscient bureaucrat whose sole decisional rule was to
maximize resolution of employment discrimination claims. As we
shall see below, however, the incentive effects and related problems in
giving the EEOC significant discretion in deciding which cases to pro-
cess and which to abandon through the issuance of an early right-to-
sue letter make such an assumption unreasonable in the real world.
5
1
Several district courts have also held that early right-to-sue letters
are permissible and that a plaintiff may sue prior to the expiration of
45 See Bryant v. Cal. Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[I]n 1973-
1974, the undermanned EEOC staff faced a huge backlog of Tide VII cases .... Given
this state of affairs, it would be a travesty to require the EEOC and Bryant to mark time
until 180 days were counted off."), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 444 U.S. 598
(1980).
46 Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc., 644 F.2d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1980).
47 Id.
48 240 F.3d 1268, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2001).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1275.
51 Infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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180 days. The districtjudge in Parker v. Noble Roman's, Inc., in denying
a motion to dismiss, expressed disappointment that the EEOC acted
very quickly without any effort to settle but nevertheless allowed an
early suit to proceed. 5 In Parker, EEOC personnel suggested that
plaintiffs counsel ask for a right-to-sue letter only one day after the
charges were filed; the EEOC issued the letter seven days after the
charges were filed and before the defendant employer even had the
opportunity to respond to an invitation to attend a nonadversarial set-
tlement discussion.53
In another case, despite the defendant's assertion that the plain-
tiff asked for a right-to-sue letter to deliberately circumvent the EEOC
investigatory process, the court refused to find 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.28(a) (2) invalid and allowed the suit to go forward. 4  The
court emphasized the clear statement by the Commission that it would
not be able to investigate and conciliate the charge within 180 days,
and the court discounted the circumstances that led to the issuance of
the letter.
Another district court allowed suit after an early right-to-sue letter
despite its finding that "Congress showed clear preference for con-
ciliatory efforts at the administrative level prior to suit in federal
court. 5 6 The court reasoned that when employer-defendants try to
use the language of the statute that suggests that the EEOC has juris-
diction for the first 180 days to prevent suits, they disregard the pur-
pose of Title VII and turn the statute on its head' 7 Citing Chevron, the
court found that the EEOC had authority to fill in gaps in the statute
and, because the Commission did not contravene congressional in-
tent, upheld the regulation. 5
Another court took a practical approach, determining that "re-
quiring the plaintiff in such a case to sit twiddling her thumbs and
52 See No. IP-96-65-C-D/F, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10653, at *5 (S.D. Ind. June 26,
1996) ("We hope the EEOC's actions here are merely isolated accidents by an over-
worked and underappreciated federal agency."), defendant's mot. for summ. j. granted in
part and denied in part, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22885 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 1997).
53 Id. at * 1-2.
54 DeFranks v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 95-327, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15715,
at *16-17 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1995).
55 Id. at *19.
56 Rolark v. Univ. ofChi. Hosps., 688 F. Supp. 401, 404 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
57 See id. (stating that the purpose of the 180-day period is to afford victims of em-
ployment discrimination private causes of action where the EEOC fails to act or does
not act in a timely fashion).
58 See id. ("It is up to the EEOC to decide how to efficiently administer the
Act....").
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'flattening her time' by watching the days drift by until there finally
appeared the time when a remedy was available would just not make
sense." 9 The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.0 It in-
terpreted the 180-day period as a ceiling rather than a floor for EEOC
investigation. While the court agreed that the Commission likely
would be more efficient in resolving complaints, it noted that
"[p]ersons aggrieved by discriminatory employment practices must be
afforded a forum in which to assert their rights, and when the EEOC
is unable to act, the district court stands ready."61 This reasoning may
be flawed because it takes an ex post rather than an ex ante approach.
Changing the rule for what appears to be just or equitable in a par-
ticular instance for an individual party is likely to alter incentives in
the future. 2 A previous commentator on this topic exhibits a similar
logical shortcoming: " [T] he Martini decision has made it increasingly
difficult for aggrieved persons to obtain relief for acts of employment
discrimination. Consequently, the result of the court's holding in
Martini is flawed.,
63
Even assuming that making it easier for allegedly aggrieved per-
sons to obtain relief should be encouraged,64 a regime that overall
59 Cattell v. Bob Frensley Ford, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 617, 622 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 A hypothetical inspired by Judge Posner's concurrence in Chicago Board of Real-
tors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 1987), illustrates this point. Take,
for example, a rule prohibiting eviction of widows and orphans from rental housing
until they are delinquent in payments for an extremely long time, say one full year. A
court considering this rule from an ex post perspective might reason that it benefits
those widows and orphans who cannot pay their rent and therefore uphold the rule.
But over time, this rule would likely cause landlords to charge higher monthly rent to
make up for the probability that they would not receive rent for an extended period of
time prior to eviction or reduce the amount landlords spend on improvements or
maintenance, thus charging the same price for a lesser quality product. The net result
would be a decrease in welfare for the widows and orphans who then might be unable
to afford decent housing. If most widows and orphans pay their rent on time but bear
the increased rental costs, the intended beneficience of the decision could be offset by
the large unintended consequences of the decision. From an ex ante perspective, as-
suming the goal is to maximize aggregate utility, the benefit to the delinquent tenants
is likely to be trumped by the increased rent for all, which would make such a rule in-
efficient and one that should not be imposed.
(3 Nathan C. Sprague, Comment, Is the Honeymoon Over? The Fate of the EEOC and
the Early Right-To-Sue Letter, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 572, 583 (2000).
64 This assumption may be faulty because each complaint filed against an em-
ployer imposes a significant cost on that firm. Even complaints that are completely
frivolous will not likely result in recovery of costs by the firm-the individual plaintiff is
likely to be judgment proof-though perhaps the plaintiffs lawyer could be charged
with costs. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (providing standards for and enumerating
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makes relief easier for meritorious Title VII plaintiffs while forcing
some to wait some period less than 180 days to go to court should be
favored if the net result is improved adjudication and resolution of
the discrimination charges. Plaintiffs who would end up going to dis-
trict court and prevailing on the merits under either regime are bene-
fited by a legal regime allowing them to sue earlier. Allowing early
suits, however, means the EEOC will be less likely to investigate and
resolve claims. Some cases that could have been resolved by the
EEOC will then instead have to go to district court. In the aggregate,
Title VII plaintiffs may be disadvantaged by what seems to be a benefi-
cial regime from an ex post perspective.
The arguments for allowing early right-to-sue letters and suits in
district court are most persuasive when examining the plight of an in-
dividual plaintiff who would be burdened by having to wait extra time
until his complaint is heard in district court if the case were remanded
to the EEOC to run out the clock on the 180-day period. One major
problem is the negative incentive effect that such a rule likely places
on the Commission-it removes motivation to act more efficiently or
change its operating procedure to carry out its statutory duty. A sec-
ond criticism is a separation-of-powers argument that the Commission
has unreasonably interpreted its organic statute and that if the proce-
dures (perhaps justifiably) should be changed, then Congress is the
proper forum for that change rather than the Commission.
With the judicial branch determining whether the Commission
has the power to issue early right-to-sue letters, the results have been
split fairly evenly. I next turn to the legislative history in an attempt to
determine what Congress intended in enacting the statute.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 2000E-5(B)
A crucial question in determining the intent of the framers of the
EEOC's enabling statute is what they expected would happen if there
were a backlog of cases and the Commission could not act on a suffi-
cient number of them within the 180 days set by the statute. There is
credible evidence supporting two possible interpretations, but it is not
clear that the framers actually considered this precise question.
First, members of Congress were aware of the backlog that the
EEOC faced in 1971 when this provision was included in a bill modify-
ing the enforcement procedures and jurisdiction of the EEOC. At
potential sanctions against parties who file frivolous pleadings).
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least one Senator recognized the relative workloads of the EEOC and
the district courts and understood that they were both possible fora
for the resolution of employment discrimination claimsY.6 ' The
Chairman of the EEOC testified in 1971 that the Commission's back-
log was 32,000 cases and that the median time for resolution by the
EEOC was eighteen to twenty-four months.6 In contrast, the median
time for a case in district court to move from issuance to trial in a non-
jury trial in 1971 was ten months, and the twenty-nine district courts
that were expected to hear the largest share of the cases had median
67times to trial of twelve months or less. Members of the House were
68
also aware of the backlog of the EEOC in resolving cases.
The majority report of the House Committee on Education and
Labor asserted a competence argument in favor of an administrative
resolution of employment discrimination by the Commission:
Administrative tribunals are better suited to rapid resolution of such
complex issues than are Courts. Efficiency and predictability will be en-
hanced if the necessarily detailed case by case findings of fact and fash-
ioning of remedy is performed by experts in the subject matter. Moreo-
ver, administrative tribunals are less subject to technical rules... and are
less constrained by formal rules of evidence-which give rise to a length-
ier (and more costly) process of proof.69
This argument is in favor of the Commission having the opportunity
to resolve the dispute before allowing plaintiffs to proceed in United
States district court. It does not speak directly to the question of the
ability of an overworked Commission to allow a plaintiff to go to court
prior to the end of the 180-day period.
One statement of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare provides support for allowance of early right-to-sue letters:
" [W] here the Commission is not able to pursue a complaint with satis-
factory speed ... the bill provides that the [plaintiff] shall have an
65 See S. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, REPORT ON S. 2515, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1971, S. REP. No. 92-415, at 87
(1971) (views of Sen. Dominick) ("To a large extent, speedy resolution of an unfair




68 SeeH.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 58 (1971) (minority views) ("[W]e fear that, in view
of the estimated 18-month to two-year backlog that currently exists at the EEOC, the
intent of H.R. 1746 to expand the EEOC's jurisdiction will serve only to retard and
frustrate the purposes and objectives of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act."),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2167.
69 Id. at 1], repinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2146.
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opportunity to seek his own remedy... ,,70 This suggests that the 180-
day period is there to protect plaintiffs from agency inaction. It fol-
lows that if the Commission states that it will be unable to act, then
suit in the district court should be allowed immediately. The Commit-
tee went on to note that this would be an exceptional course of action
after the EEOC's procedures were implemented and suggested that
this would be only a temporarily available option.7' Since the EEOC
today faces a backlog that the framers of the legislation most likely did
not expect would occur thirty years after its enactment, it is unclear if
a contemporary observer should give much weight to this statement.
7
2
Other statements from the same report provide evidence that the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare was concerned with provid-
ing a prompt remedy for the employee and therefore would support
early right-to-sue letters. The Committee wrote that "[t]he primary
concern should be to protect the aggrieved person's option to seek a
prompt remedy., 73 It noted that six months would normally be a suf-
ficient time for "the normal case to be processed from complaint to
order" and stated that the Commission should have to explain to a
court if it requested additional time.74 The Committee instructed the
Commission to "develop its capacity to proceed rapidly with the hear-
ing and decision on charges once the complaint has issued."75 An-
other question therefore is raised-what should happen if the Com-
mission is unable to do so? Does it matter if the failure is due to lack
of funding from Congress, on the one hand, or administrative incom-
petence or inability to solve the problem, on the other hand?
A reasonable examination of the legislative history of this provi-
70 S. REP. No. 92-415, at 23 (1971).
71 The Committee stated:
It is expected that recourse to this remedy will be the exception and not the
rule, particularly once the Commission's enforcement procedures are fully
operational. In the meantime, however, the committee believes that the ag-
grieved person should be given an opportunity to escape the administrative
process when he feels his claim has not been given adequate attention.
Id.
72 One possible way to examine this situation is to assume that Congress has some
knowledge of the EEOC backlog and the use of early right-to-sue letters. An oversight
committee has regular hearings on the operation of the Commission and approves its
budget. Inasmuch as Congress could amend the statute to clarify that the provision is
intended to give the EEOC exclusive jurisdiction for the first 180 days, one could con-
clude that its silence can be interpreted as authorizing the Commission to grant early
right-to-sue letters.
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sion can tell only a few things about the intent of Congress in drafting
it. We cannot go back in time to ask this specific question of the pur-
pose of the 180-day period. We can only look to see if it has been an-
swered with some clarity. First, members of Congress were aware of
the backlog the EEOC was facing-three to four times the statutory
180-day period-and still included the provision of 180 days in the
legislation. This suggests that the 180 days might have been seen as a
minimum time for the EEOC to try to resolve the claim. Second, the
framers were also aware of data that suggested the resolution of dis-
crimination claims might be quicker in the district courts. 6 The
choice of the forum likely to result in slower resolution of claims sug-
gests that there was an interest in administrative resolution-either
based on perceived expertise of the Commission, cost savings, a desire
not to burden the workload of the courts, or some other reason. Per-
haps Congress believed that giving the EEOC "first crack" at these
cases was worth something, which would weigh against allowing early
right-to-sue letters.
There is no evidence that this precise question was discussed by ei-
ther the House or Senate committees or on the floor of either body
before the legislation was passed.7 Finding that the results of the sur-
vey of the legislative history are inconclusive, I turn next to an eco-
nomic analysis of the question of whether the Commission should be
76 The statistic quoted by the committees does not tell the whole story. The House
committee minority listed the intervals of time in 1971 in each of the twenty-nine dis-
tricts that were within the top ten states in volume of employment discrimination cases.
H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 60-61 (1971) (minority views), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2170. Some of the representatives recognized that it takes time for a court to
issue a decision but nevertheless maintained that "such forum would clearly be quicker
[than an administrative proceeding]." Id. at 60 (minority views), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2170.
77 The legislative reenactment doctrine-the absence of action by Congress to
overturn regulations that its members are presumed to be aware of-is often relied
upon in tax cases to provide support for the position that Congress approves of the
regulation. See Jay Katz, The Deductibility of Educational Costs, 17 VA. TAX REV. 1, 93
(1997) ("Even if the Current Regulations were challenged as unreasonable, the doc-
trine of legislative reenactment could be invoked to invalidate them. Under this doc-
trine, Congress is deemed to approve of existing regulations when it reenacts the un-
derlying code section(s) without substantial change."); see also Connor v. WTI, 67 F.
Supp. 2d 690, 696 n.9 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("[T]he Court notes that the EEOC promul-
gated its early right-to-sue regulation in 1977... and for the past twenty-two years
Congress has elected not to override the provision, despite the fact that every pre-
printed dismissal order issued by the EEOC includes 'right-to-sue requested' as a rea-
son for dismissal."). For a discussion of some criticisms of the legislative reenactment
doctrine, see William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68
IND. L.J. 865, 884-89 (1993).
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able to issue early right-to-sue letters allowing persons alleging em-
ployment discrimination to sue in United States district court prior to
the end of the 180-day period stated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1).
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE EARLY RIGHT-TO-SUE PROVISION
The regulation granting the EEOC the power to issue early right-
to-sue letters has merit in eliminating the need for plaintiffs to "mark
time" or "run out the clock" when the Commission is not likely to re-
solve the case within the statutory 180-day period. The primary con-
cern is the incentive effects of giving the EEOC a means to avoid its
duties when it is overworked, underfunded, or otherwise unable to
complete the mission with which it is charged. But there are several
other factors affecting the costs and benefits of the system that are
discussed below.
A. Costs of Not Allowing Early Suits
Assuming that the EEOC cannot and does not resolve the charge
but the plaintiff is required to wait 180 days until it is filed, one direct
cost is the increase in potential damages that a plaintiff will receive
due to delayed resolution of the claim. Damages available for an em-
ployee that has been wrongfully terminated include back pay from the
time of discharge to the date of the court's decision, limited to two
years prior to the date of filing a charge with the Commission. 8 As-
suming a reasonable time for preliminary processing by the EEOC of
30 days, with the current regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 in place, the
claim could be filed in district court on day 31 (the hypothetical date
of receipt of a right-to-sue letter) rather than day 181 (the expiration
of the statutory period). The result, ceteris paribus, would be resolution
of the claim 150 days earlier. If the plaintiff was successful at trial, and
the defendant liable for back pay, this cost could be quite substantial.7 '
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(I) (1994) (listing remedies for violations of Title
VII).
79 The amount of increased damages in this case could be more than one-third of
annual pay. If the remedy is to give back pay and return the employee to work, then
the firm is forced to pay back wages and not receive any benefit in its output. The em-
ployee may in some sense be thought of as receiving a windfall bonus of salary paid
without working. But it is a loss to society of that employee's output of goods or serv-
ices for that time and a deadweight loss of salary paid without benefits received. It
would be Kaldor-Hicks preferred for the worker to have actually produced something
during this time-he could have returned to work 150 days earlier and improved the
economy's output. The statute does provide that "[i]nterim earnings or amounts
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A court may also award attorney's fees to a successful Title VII plain-
tiff. 0 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has stated that under
"Title VII a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's
fees in all but special circumstances.""' It is reasonable to assume that
attorney's fees could be increased because of the extra time involved
and that would increase the potential liability for a defendant who is
deciding whether to settle or go to trial. Even if the defendant pre-
vails, legal expenses will likely be greater during the extra time re-
quired to resolve the suit. A rational method for the employer to con-
sider a lawsuit, as any contingent liability, is as the probability of loss
times the damages if the plaintiff prevails. If the possible damages are
increased due to increased time to resolution, the defendant may be
more likely to settle a suit (even if it is without merit).
8 2 The plaintiff
is perhaps also affected by the delay and further uncertainty, as he
might not know if he will receive any awards of pay or be returned to
his previous job (by court order should he prevail) for an extra 150
days.83 So his incentives to settle a suit might also be affected-the
plaintiff may need money sooner rather than later.84 The relative im-
portance of these two opposing factors-the influence of the financial
earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against
shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." Id. If the employee is
unable to find other employment, however, the damages would be the full amount of
salary. In times of recession, or for workers whose skills are in relatively low demand in
a given locale, the inability to find ajob would be greater, and therefore the potential
employee liability would be greater.
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).
81 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978).
82 Assume that the potential damages with the allowance of early suits are $50,000.
Adding back pay of $10,000 during the extra 120 days on which the EEOC retains ju-
risdiction of the case absent early right-to-sue and $5000 additional attorneys' fees for
each side, this could alter the decision of a rational, risk-neutral defendant deciding
whether to settle. Assume that probability of plaintiff's success (P) is 40%. Therefore
the expected value of the defendant's loss would be $20,000 allowing an early suit and
$28,000 if early suits were not allowed. A defendant faced with a higher expected loss
might be induced to settle a claim by the change in the legal regime.
83 A court has wide discretion to order equitable remedies, including reinstate-
ment, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-g(1).
84 If we could assume efficient capital markets, then this concern would go away.
That is, with perfect information, the plaintiff could borrow against his future potential
judgment and would not be induced to act differently due to lack of capital. As Judge
Posner has explained, "[S]ociety undertakes a variety of measures to compensate
for... failure of the capital markets... "RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 144 n.2 (4th ed. 1992). With inefficient capital markets, it might be the choice
of Congress to ease burdens on plaintiffs with such measures as shifting the burden of
proof or providing for punitive damages or the award of attorney's fees in Title VII
cases.
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uncertainty on the employee and employer-will affect which way the
effect of delay cuts. If the plaintiff is a minimum-wage employee suing
a very large corporation such as Wal-Mart, then this effect of delay
may adversely affect the Title VII plaintiff more than the defendant,
inasmuch as a risk of thousands of dollars is a larger portion of the
plaintiffs resources than it is to a large corporation. But the employ-
ment discrimination provisions of Title VII also apply to small busi-
nesses, 85 and an employer with seventeen employees that is teetering
on the edge of insolvency and discharges for cause two high-level em-
ployees who are members of protected classes (for example, an Afri-
can American who charges racial discrimination and a woman who
charges gender discrimination), the delay and uncertainty may hurt
the defendant more.
B. Benefits of Not Allowing Early Suits
Even if disallowing early suits increases legal fees, expenses, and
potential damages, there is a large potential benefit, namely, the pos-
sibility of resolution of the case during the extended time. The
shadow of the EEOC may induce an employer to settle a case with a
plaintiff, even if the Commission does not do anything directly.
Moreover, the EEOC may be able to arrange a meeting or settlement
conference in which the parties could sit down and attempt to resolve
the dispute. Another possibility is that this 180-day period could be
thought of as a "cooling-off' period that has been used in other areas
of the federal law such as labor disputes."' "The purpose of the statu-
torily imposed cooling-off period is to give the parties enough time to
conduct calm negotiations and resolve their differences .... "8
Rather than forcing the parties into the adversarial proceeding of a
district court, a few months of reflection might lead one side to realize
5 "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year .... 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1994).
86 As will be seen below, the portion of cases that the EEOC is able to resolve in a
manner favorable to plaintiffs is roughly ten percent. See infra notes 112-16 and ac-
companying text (discussing the number of cases resolved through settlements or
withdrawals with benefits).
87 One such example is the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188, which im-
poses a thirty-day cooling-off period for transportation employees before they go on
strike.
88 Local 553, Transp. Workers Union v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 695 F.2d 668, 674 (2d
Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 150: 689
2001] EEOC'S ISSUANCE OF EARL Y RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTRS 707
that it is wrong or at least that there is room to compromise and settle
the case before going to district court.
C. Costs of Early Suits
If the issuance of early right-to-sue letters becomes the rule rather
than the exception that the Senate committee had envisioned, or at
least a more regular event, a plaintiff might include a request for early
right-to-sue with his complaint or shortly after the complaint is filed.""
Some simple cases that the EEOC could more easily resolve could be
channeled directly into district court, which would impose costs on
the parties, the legal system, and other litigants on the docket in the
district court. The EEOC might be able to resolve a case with some
investigation, a settlement conference, and the advice or urging of an
administrator that a case has a clear outcome or likely victory for one
side or another. For a hypothetical "cheap" case with twenty-five
hours of work, the EEOC might resolve a complaint for $500. If in-
stead it went to court, the parties would incur additional legal ex-
penses. Once a complaint is filed, depositions will likely have to be
taken and extensive discovery may be required. Because of the fact-
intensive nature of employment discrimination cases, these cases may
be more difficult to resolve through summary judgments than other
types of cases. "0 Some of these "easy" cases could go to trial because
they turn on credibility of witnesses and even if it is reasonably clear
which side will prevail, there may be a genuine issue of material fact
that precludes summary disposition. ' Adding these "easy" cases to a
district court's docket could impose substantial costs to all the parties
on that docket.2
W See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing a case in which the plain-
tiffs counsel asked for a right-to-sue letter the day after charges were filed).
M The United States Supreme Court has stated that "'trial courts or reviewing
courts should [not] treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of
fact."' St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) (quoting United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)). But discrimination
cases often turn on testimony of what happened at certain emotional times, and each
side's witnesses may interpret the same events very differently. The conflicting affida-
vits of these witnesses may prevent the resolution of cases at the summary judgment
stage.
See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (providing standards for summaryjudgment).
A small delay affecting parties can amount to a large cost. Think of a toll booth.
One additional car might stop for ten seconds, but, if it delays each of 100 vehicles be-
hind it, the marginal cost of that vehicle being on the road during rush hour is not the
trivial ten seconds but 1000 seconds or almost fifteen minutes of valuable time lost.
Similarly, if each case that could have been resolved by the EEOC goes to court and
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D. Benefits of Early Suits
Disputes that begin in the EEOC and are investigated for 180 days
yet not resolved are in some sense failures for the Commission. The
time spent in the Commission is likely without benefit, except perhaps
if the issues are narrowed or the dispute that will proceed to the dis-
trict court is clarified. The cost of the EEOC staff that investigates
and processes the complaint is borne by the taxpayers, as is the cost of
district court staff. For those cases in which nothing is gained through
the EEOC processing of the charges, taxpayers pay costs of both
Commission and district court proceedings for a considerable amount
of activity that is duplicative. This is likely the most substantial cost of
not allowing early suits. Allowing early suits avoids this expenditure.
Disregarding the negative incentive effects, following the EEOC regu-
lation would probably provide a large net benefit.
E. Net Costs and Benefits Are Unclear
Inasmuch as there are several factors working in either direction,
it is not clear whether allowing early suits has a net cost or benefit.
Some of the factors depend upon empirical data that are not immedi-
ately available. The costs and benefits are likely within the same ball-
park or order of magnitude, so without empirical analysis it is not pos-
sible to conclude that allowing early suits is better than not allowing
such suits. Perhaps the optimal answer is a bolder solution that
changes the current relationship between the EEOC and the courts
rather than simply working at the margins. Next I discuss two alterna-
tives to the current system ofjurisdictional overlap between the EEOC
and the district courts.
V. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A larger question underlying this narrow issue of early right-to-sue
letters is the role, if any, the EEOC should take in employment dis-
crimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This dual system of enforcement has both costs and benefits, but
rather than modifying the process of early right-to-sue letters, at least
two more decisive alternatives exist. Both are significant changes and
delays each of ten cases by three days, the marginal cost of that suit going to trial is
quite substantial.
93 A pro se plaintiff, without the help of a detailed knowledge of the legal terms of
art, might benefit from someone at the EEOC clarifying the issues or allegations.
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would require an overhaul of the statutory structure through new leg-
islation. Each recognizes that a middle-of-the-road solution may be
ineffective and that the Commission should not continue in an under-
funded and ineffective manner. Instead, the EEOC should be given
the power it needs to act in the nation's interest to resolve employ-
ment discrimination claims efficiently. Alternatively, the Commission
should be eliminated in recognition that times have changed and
that, some thirty-five years after its creation, it is no longer necessary
94
to serve its initial purposes.
One option is eliminating the EEOC altogether. Just as in most
other civil violations of federal law, the plaintiff would file suit in dis-
trict court within a specified time after the alleged incident, and the
court would have exclusive jurisdiction. The biggest concern is the
expense-in terms of time and money-of expanding the jurisdiction
of the already overworked federal district courts.
The opposite alternative is to give the agency exclusive jurisdiction
over simple employment discrimination cases, namely those involving
one plaintiff, one defendant, and a discrete set of facts.
9 Administra-
tive hearings could be held with appeal to an Article III court (either
the local district court or regional circuit court of appeal). The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board and the Social Security Administration
use this procedure . Appeals from final orders of the former agency
are heard by a circuit court;" appeals from the latter, by a district
court.98 I will discuss in turn the merits of these alternative systems of
administration of Title VII. Before commencing a discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of each proposed alternative system, a few
words about how much money the EEOC spends and how many cases
it is able to resolve are in order.
The EEOC had an annual budget of $242 million for fiscal year
94 This reasoning is analogous to arguments made by opponents of so-called af-
firmative action programs that the harmful effects of past, demonstrable discrimina-
tion have been cured and that, therefore, affirmative action has become obsolete,
since its purpose of curing such harms has been satisfied.
95 So called "pattern or practice" suits involving more complicated violations have
more complicated issues that might not be resolved effectively within this framework.
96 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1994) (describing the procedures of the National
Labor Relations Board for preventing unfair employment practices); 42 U.S.C. § 405
(1994) (describing the procedure for establishment of Social Security benefits and the
process by which termination of benefits may be appealed).
Y7 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994).
98 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994).
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("FY") 1998,91) $279 million for FY 1999,00 and $281 million for FY
2000.10' Projections for future years are for a small increase and then
constant funding for the Commission.' 2 It employed a full-time staff
of 2,852 employees at the end of FY 2000,10 down nearly one quarter
from its staff of 3,752 in 1979.104 Inasmuch as the EEOC administers
charges other than Title VII, assuming the amount of work is spread
equally among all types of cases, this amounts to about $3,520 for each
charge filed in FY 2000.10° For FY 2000, the last year for which data are
available, out of the 57,136 Title VII cases the EEOC resolved only
11,875, or 20.8%, were so-called "merit resolutions"-cases resolved
with outcomes favorable to the charging parties (employees) or foundS 101,
to have meritorious allegations. This relative success was anoma-
lous, as the previous year saw only 15.6% of claims reach merit resolu-
tions, and, in the eight fiscal years preceding 2000, the highest per-
Vj OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR
2000, at 589 (United States Government Printing Office CD-ROM, Feb. 1999) [herein-
after FY 2000 BUDGET] .
100 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR
2001, at 131 (United States Government Printing Office CD-ROM, Feb. 2000).
101 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Re-
quest and Annual Performance Plan (2001), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/plan/
2002budget/salaries.html.
102 See FY 2000 BUDGET, supra note 99, at 589 (listing estimated future budgets of
the EEOC as remaining constant at $312 million).
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Budget and Staffing, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/budget.html (last modifiedJuly 25, 2001).104U
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, End of the 1980s Leaves EEOC
to Face New Challenges, in 35 YEARS OF ENSURING THE PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY, avail-
able at http://www.eeoc.gov/35th/1980s/end.html (last visitedJan. 7, 2001).
105 The total number of charges filed with the EEOC in FY 2000 was 79,896 and in
FY 1999 was 77,444. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statis-
tics: FY 1992 Through FY 2000, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modi-
fied Jan. 18, 2001). In FY 2000, the 59,588 charges filed under Title VII amount to
74.5% of the total caseload. EEOC, Title VII Charges, supra note 1. Dividing the budget
of $281 million by 79,896 yields an average cost of $3,517 per case for 2000. In FY
1999, the 57,582 charges filed under Title VII amount to 74% of the total caseload. Id.
Dividing the budget of $279 million by 77,444 cases yields an average cost of $3,603
per case for 1999.
106 EEOC, Title VII Charges, supra note 1. Merit resolutions are defined as
"[c]harges with outcomes favorable to charging parties and/or charges with meritori-
ous allegations. These include negotiated settlements, withdrawals with benefits, suc-
cessful conciliations, and unsuccessful conciliations." U.S. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, Definitions of Terms, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/define.html (last
modified Aug. 11, 1998) [hereinafter EEOC, Definitions of Terms].
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centage of cases categorized as merit resolutions was 15.7%.17 In fis-
cal years 2000 and 1999, some 3,705 and 2,515 cases, respectively,
were categorized as reaching merit resolutions, even though they
ended in unsuccessful conciliations after the Commission investigated
and determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that dis-
crimination occurred. 0 8 The majority of cases resolved by the EEOC
in FY 2000-33,822 or 59.2%-were categorized as "no reasonable
cause. In FY 1999, the numbers were similar-35,614 or 60.3%
were classified as "no reasonable cause.""0 The charging party has the
right to sue in district court after such finding is made. The cases in
which an early right-to-sue letter is issued are included in this category
of resolution. In each of the past nine fiscal years, the "no reasonable
cause" category has been listed for a majority of the Commission's
resolutions."' In one-fifth of the EEOC's resolutions in FY 2000 (and
in nearly one quarter in FY 1999), the charge was closed for adminis-
trative reasons."2 These include failure to locate the charging party,
failure of the charging party to respond to EEOC communications,
failure to accept full relief, and lack of statutory jurisdiction.'" Putting
administrative closure and findings of no reasonable cause together,
in eight of the past nine fiscal years, over four-fifths of resolutions can
by any reasonable definition be considered unsuccessful, and FY 2000
narrowly missed that mark with 79.2%.'
14
107 EEOC, Title VII Charges, supra note 1.
108 Id. An unsuccessful conciliation is defined as a "[c]harge with reasonable cause
determination closed after efforts to conciliate the charge are unsuccessful. Pursuant
to Commission policy, the field office will close the charge and review it for litigation
consideration." EEOC, Definitions of Terms, supra note 106.
109 EEOC, Title VII Charges, supra note 1. No reasonable cause is defined: "EEOC's
determination of no reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred based
upon evidence obtained in investigation." EEOC, Definitions of Terms, supra note 106.
110 EEOC, Title VII Charges, supra note 1.
Id.
11 Id.
13 EEOC, Definitions of Terms, supra note 106.
''4
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Administrative 22.6 27.0 34.2 35.0 28.7 27.8 26.5 24.1 20.0
Closures (%)
No Reasonable 61.6 57.5 50.8 53.9 62.9 61.9 62.1 60.3 59.2
Cause (%)
84.2 84.5 85.0 88.9 91.6 89.7 88.6 84.4 79.2
EEOC, Title VII Charges, supra note 1 (calculations by author).
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The EEOC has had some success in achieving settlements between
the charging party and the respondent and withdrawals of charges af-
ter the charging party received the desired benefits. FY 2000 brought
more success than other recent years, with 4,828 settlements (8.3%)
and 2,251 withdrawals with benefits (3.9%). "5 In FY 1999, there were
3,748 settlements (6.3%) and 2,084 withdrawals with benefits
(3.5%)." These resolutions are those in which an administrative pro-
cess is very likely superior to a private action in district court. The ex-
penses of the parties are almost certainly lower through this adminis-
trative resolution than had the parties gone to court. But is a success
rate of around ten percent good enough to require all parties in all
cases to go through the EEOC? Again, using rough back-of-the-
envelope calculations, dividing the pro-rata share of the EEOC's
budget in FY 1999 assumed to go toward Title VII cases-roughly $206
million-by the number of settlements and withdrawals with benefits
yields a high price tag of $29,573 per successful resolution in FY 2000,
down substantially from a cost of over $35,000 per successful resolu-
tion in FY 1999.17 Put in this perspective, the cost of EEOC resolution
may be much higher than allowing immediate direct suits in United
States district courts for all Title VII plaintiffs. Although ten percent
of cases resolved by the EEOC have favorable outcomes, the remain-
ing ninety percent of claims necessarily require some duplication of
spending.
Eliminating the EEOC would allow a plaintiff to proceed directly
to district court and to get his proverbial "day in court" sooner. While
substantial savings of over one-quarter of a billion dollars (the EEOC
budget) is a huge advantage, the increased workload of the federal
115 Id.
11 Id. The data are similar for most of the seven fiscal years preceding 1999, al-
though FY 2000 had a higher proportion of settlements than previous years. Settle-
ments ranged from a low of 3.0% in FY 1996 to a high of 6.9% in FY 1992. Id. With-
drawals with benefits ranged from a low of 3.1% in FY 1997 to a high of 7.0% in FY
1993. Id. The percentage of cases successfully resolved ranged from a low of 6.5% in
FY 1997 to a high of 13.2% in F 1993 and is generally around 10% of the cases re-
solved in a given year. Id.
117 The EEOC total budget for FY 2000 was $281 million and 74.5% of the cases
filed were under Title VII. Thus, assuming even distribution of costs across cases,
$209,345,000 was spent on Title VII cases. Dividing this amount by the sum of the set-
tlements and withdrawals with benefits (7,079) yields an average expense of $29,573
per successful resolution in FY 2000. The EEOC total budget for FY 1999 was $279 mil-
lion and 74% of the cases filed were under Title VII. Thus, $206,460,000 was spent on
Title VII cases. Dividing this amount by the sum of the settlements and withdrawals
with benefits (5,832) yields an average expense of $35,401 per successful resolution for
FY 1999.
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district courts is the corresponding disadvantage. Perhaps some cases
would not be filed in district court for various reasons if the EEOC
were eliminated,"8 but if they were filed in district court, the result
would be an increase in the caseload of each district judge of nearly
ninety cases per year.H9 This is quite substantial considering the num-
ber of civil filings per authorized district court judgeship was around
400 in 1998, 1999, and 2000. 12 But several things could be done to
mitigate the effect of this caseload increase. The most straightforward
solution would be to increase the number of district judges. Another
would be to make more effective use of the magistrate judges-the
parties could consent to try the case before a magistrate judge as they
can today,' 2' or the statute could provide for trial before a magistrate
judge when the claim is below a jurisdictional amount such as
$10,000.122 The district courts could establish programs of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR") for employment discrimination claims. 22
118 For example, the filing fee in federal court might keep some would-be plaintiffs
from filing. But if the market for contingency fee plaintiffs lawyers is efficient, that
should not be a concern for plaintiffs whose cases have merit. Based on a pure market
approach to obtaining a plaintiffs contingency fee lawyer, if a claim is valid, then put-
ting the "probable merit of his case to the test of the market" will mean that good cases
will attract lawyers who wish to prosecute them. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769
(7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). If a plaintiff
"cannot retain a lawyer on a contingent fee basis the natural inference to draw is that
he does not have a good case." Id. at 770.
19 In January 2000, there were 651 district judgeships authorized under 28 U.S.C.
§ 133(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Dividing the FY 2000 EEOC charges filed under Tide
VII (57,582) by the 651 authorized district court judges yields 88.5 cases per authorized
judge.
LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:
2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 22 tbl.4, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/front/2000artext.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2001).
121 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1994) (granting magistrate judges authority to con-
duct all proceedings of a civil matter upon consent of the parties). Adding more mag-
istratejudges would not have the potential harmful effects some predict if the number
of district judges increases. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 111, 65
B.U. L. REV. 205, 269 n.215 (1985) ("Many of those generally sympathetic to the fed-
eral judiciary have expressed concern that overexpansion of the federal bench could
weaken the prestrige currently enjoyed by Article III judges-prestige that serves ... to
legitimate judicial decisions.
122 A district court may grant jurisdiction to a magistrate judge to sentence indi-
viduals charged with misdemeanors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (a) (1994). By similar
reasoning, a less significant civil controversy involving lower alleged monetary damages
might be transferred automatically to the magistrate judge.
123 ADR is an umbrella term that includes arbitration, early neutral evaluation,
stipulated fact-finding, mediation, mini-trials, negotiation, summary jury trials, and
other methods to resolve disputes using non-traditional methods. See Richard C. Reu-
ben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L.
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Perhaps the EEOC could be reconstituted as an optional ADR pro-
gram that could try to resolve the case upon the election of one or
both parties.
Since these cases are often fact-intensive and therefore not con-
ducive to summary disposition, the elimination of the EEOC could
pose significant challenges for thejudiciary. An alternative, then, is to
give the EEOC significantly more control over employment discrimi-
nation and then to hear appeals in an Article III court. The merits of
such a plan are discussed next.
An increased role for the EEOC would require additional funding
for the Commission but reduce the workload of the federal courts in
employment discrimination cases to a supervisory or appellate func-
tion. The parties could present evidence to a non-Article III adminis-
trative law judge ("ALJ") employed by the Commission. The ALJ
would be an attorney with specialized expertise in the area of em-
ployment discrimination who could hear these claims. A House
committee discussing the enforcement provisions of Title VII noted
that an agency tribunal staffed by experts and not subject to the tech-
nical rules of procedure of district courts would be better than courts
at resolving complex Title VII cases.124 Appeals from an ALJ's ruling
could be heard by an appeals panel as of right within the EEOC and
then perhaps to the full Commission on a discretionary basis. In
many cases, this would be the end of the process for the parties, but
either party could then appeal to the district court or circuit court of
appeal. 25 This right of appeal would provide the legitimacy of an Ar-
ticle III court to the process but likely result in substantial monetary
savings. One criticism of this plan might be a perceived lack of impar-
tiality of the decision makers. The EEOC's mission is to remedy
REV. 577, 580 n.3 (1997) (describing in detail different methods of ADR).
124 See supra text accompanying note 69 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 11
(1971), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2146).
125 Congress would decide which court should hear the appeal depending upon
factors such as the perceived complexity of the cases and whether Congress felt a trial
judge, whose specialty is fact finding, would be more competent than an appellate
panel, whose expertise is in deciding questions of law. District courts now hear appeals
from bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994).
126 This criticism was raised by the minority committee report in the House of
Representatives enacting the 1972 amendments to Title VII. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238,
at 59 (minority views) ("We contend that the EEOC has attained an image as an advo-
cate of civil rights, and properly so. For this very reason, we submit that it cannot be an
impartial arbiter of the law."), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2169. Others have
expressed concern over the quality of administrative decision making. SeeA. Leo Levin
& Michael E. Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1650 (1995)
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employment discrimination. Therefore, it could be perceived as bi-
ased against employers and likely to find instances of discrimination
in cases in which discrimination did not occur. But safeguards can be
established to minimize this concern, and appeals to independent Ar-
ticle III courts also protect employers from abuses by the Commission.
CONCLUSION
The EEOC has issued a regulation allowing itself to cede its juris-
diction when a midlevel bureaucrat decides that the Commission
probably will not be able to complete its statutory duty of attempting
to resolve an employment discrimination claim. This action by the
EEOC suggests that there is a problem with the procedures for en-
forcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Disagreement
among federal circuit courts of appeals as to the validity of the regula-
tion suggests that both the Supreme Court and Congress should act
on this issue. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to resolve
the issue of the validity of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a).' Congress should
examine whether the system for resolving Title VII claims is working
as it was created, or as the present Congress believes it should operate.
I have suggested a framework for examining the costs and benefits of
the allowance of early suits in district court, but since the offsetting
factors are not clearly in favor of one side or the other, some ques-
tions remain that cannot be answered without detailed empirical data.
Without providing a numerical proof, I suggest that the EEOC
should not be able to issue early right-to-sue letters that allow plaintiffs
to go directly into district court. A plain reading of the text of the
underlying statute supports this conclusion. Further, the incentive ef-
fects on the EEOC and its staff of knowing that they have a way to
avoid its workload are difficult to measure but likely substantial. If
Congress wants to create a system by which the EEOC can choose the
cases it wants to try to resolve and leave other plaintiffs on their own
to go to court, it surely may do so. But it is not clear that either the
Congress that drafted the legislation or the current Congress approves
("[L]itigating in a non-Article III tribunal hardly assures high quality adjudication.").
Leo Levin and Michael Kunz also describe circumstances that put the impartiality of
ALJs into question, such as if they are constrained by allowance-rate goals that in effect
set reversal rates in advance of hearings on the merits. Id.
See SUp. CT. R. 10(a) ("The following.., indicate the character of the reasons
the Court considers [in determining whether to grant certiorari]: (a) a United States
court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United
States court of appeals on the same important matter .... ).
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of this system. The vitality of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 allows the status quo
to persist and gives the EEOC no incentive to become more efficient
in its case processing or investigation. Without this regulation, the
EEOC would be more accountable to aggrieved employees who would
demand action rather than being forced to wait 180 days for the
EEOC to "mark time" before issuing a right-to-sue letter. 12 Today, a
plaintiff's attorney who is aware of the backlog at a local EEOC office
might ask for an early right-to-sue letter as a matter of course, and the
EEOC will probably grant the request and alleviate potential political
pressure from unhappy plaintiffs. In fact, in Parker and DeFranks that
appears to be what happened. Absent this procedure, the EEOC
might be held more accountable as citizens complain to their repre-
sentatives in an effort to force the Commission to better perform its
statutory duties (or request increased funding from Congress to do
so).
The EEOC need not continue under the present regime of work-
ing on some cases, handing others off to the district court, and achiev-
ing a successful outcome in only about a tenth of those received. I
have suggested two significant alternatives to the current system of en-
forcement. Giving the EEOC exclusive original jurisdiction to hear all
Title VII cases on the merits, followed by appeals to Article III courts,
utilizes the efficiencies of specialized administrative staff that can be-
come experts in hearing these cases and eliminates costly duplication
of resources that occur in the cases that start in the EEOC and later
move to United States district court. An alternative that also elimi-
nates the costly duplication, but may substantially increase the
caseload of the federal courts, is to eliminate the EEOC's jurisdiction
over Title VII cases and allow plaintiffs to commence an action in dis-
trict court without taking a detour through the EEOC. In the end, it
may be that the current system should prevail, and, with additional re-
sources or re-allocation of resources, giving the EEOC the first crack
at resolving discrimination claims may be the most efficient system. In
the aftermath of the attacks of September 11 and the return of a
budget deficit, cutting government expenditures is once again a prior-
ity; 30 the potential savings through reform of the administration of
128 Perhaps, more properly, the plaintiff's employment discrimination bar should
monitor the Commission through its repeated interactions with the EEOC.
129 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing Parker and DeFranks).
130 I do not mean to suggest that the federal government deserves or has earned
taxpayers' money when there is a budget surplus in a given year and that the issues of
fiscal responsibility and cutting costs should be less important in times of surplus.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, either through small steps or
more drastic changes, is an area that deserves careful consideration.
* * * * * *
